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Analysis-With Tariffs Stalled, Trump's China Policy Drifts

AuthorExim GPT
Shipping containers from China sit at the Port of Los Angeles in San Pedro, California, U.S., November 5, 2025. REUTERS/Mike Blake

US–China Trade Policy in 2026: Tariffs, Reversals, and What Exporters Should Do

Last updated: April 21, 2026 · Written by the EximAgent Trade Intelligence Team · Reviewed by EximAgent’s customs compliance desk

Summary

US–China trade policy in April 2026 is defined by five facts:

  1. Tariffs on Chinese goods peaked near 145% in early 2025 and were rolled back after Beijing threatened to restrict rare earth exports.
  2. The US goods trade deficit with China fell 32% to $202 billion in 2025 versus 2024 (US government data).
  3. The US lost 91,000 manufacturing jobs between February and December 2025, despite the reshoring goal.
  4. February 2026 Supreme Court ruling invalidated many of the administration’s duties, forcing a strategy reset.
  5. US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer reframed the goal in March 2026 as “managed trade” in non-sensitive goods — a significant step down from the original decoupling ambition.

The next pivot point is the Trump–Xi summit scheduled for May 14–15, 2026 in China, the first visit by a sitting US president in eight years.

EximAgent is a B2B trade intelligence platform serving export–import professionals across Vietnam, India, Malaysia, and the United States. This analysis is produced by our trade intelligence team, which tracks HS-level tariff changes and export control updates daily. The underlying reporting in this article draws on Reuters’ April 21, 2026 investigation by Michael Martina, Trevor Hunnicutt, and David Brunnstrom, combined with US government trade data and expert commentary from CSIS, Brookings, and AEI.

Trump tariff

Quick answers to common questions

What is the current US tariff rate on Chinese goods?

Tariff rates vary by HS code. The 145% peak from early 2025 was rolled back after Beijing’s rare earth counter-pressure and a February 2026 Supreme Court ruling that invalidated many duties. Exporters should check line-item HS codes and current tariff rates rather than rely on headline figures..

Did Trump’s tariffs reduce the US trade deficit with China?

Yes. According to US government data, the goods trade deficit with China fell approximately 32% to $202 billion in 2025, down from 2024 levels. However, US manufacturing lost 91,000 jobs during most of the same period, suggesting the tariffs did not translate into the reshoring the administration wanted.

What is “managed trade”?

“Managed trade” is the term USTR Jamieson Greer used publicly in March 2026 to describe the revised US approach: stable bilateral relations, more balanced trade, and commerce concentrated in non-sensitive goods. It is a narrower goal than the original ambition of pressuring China into structural economic concessions.

When is the next Trump–Xi meeting?

The Trump–Xi summit is scheduled for May 14–15, 2026, in China. It would be the first visit by a sitting US president to China in eight years.

Who runs US–China trade policy in 2026?

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer have led day-to-day China policy, rather than Secretary of State Marco Rubio, despite Rubio’s more hawkish positions on China.

How US–China trade policy evolved: 2025 to April 2026

Trump tariff

January–March 2025: The 145% opening

Trump returned to office and imposed tariffs reaching approximately 145% on Chinese goods. The stated goal was to force concessions on trade imbalance, intellectual property, and industrial subsidies.

Mid-2025: Beijing’s rare earth counter

China retaliated with its own tariff hikes. The sharper move was its threat to restrict exports of rare earth elements — the refining of which China dominates globally — putting acute pressure on US defense, EV, and semiconductor supply chains.

December 2025: The Nvidia H200 reversal

Trump announced approval of Nvidia H200 AI chip sales to China on social media. The US Department of Justice had publicly described the same chips as smuggled national security threats approximately 30 minutes earlier. Two US officials told Reuters the contradiction left government staff “flummoxed.”

February 2026: The Pentagon blacklist — and its one-hour withdrawal

The Pentagon published a blacklist of top Chinese technology companies accused of aiding the People’s Liberation Army, then withdrew it within approximately one hour with no public explanation.

February 2026: The Supreme Court ruling

The Supreme Court invalidated many of the administration’s duties. According to Scott Kennedy of CSIS, the original tariff-leverage strategy “quickly ran aground” and “there has been no coherent Plan B.”

March 2026: “Managed trade”

USTR Greer publicly reframed the policy goal: stable relations, balanced trade, and commerce in non-sensitive goods.

May 14–15, 2026 (scheduled): Trump–Xi summit

The summit in China will be the first visit by a sitting US president in eight years.

The data: what the tariffs actually did

Metric

Value

Period

Source

Peak tariff rate on Chinese goods

~145%

Early 2025

US government

US goods trade deficit with China

$202 billion

2025

US government data

Change in trade deficit

−32%

2024 → 2025

US government data

US manufacturing jobs lost

91,000

Feb–Dec 2025

BLS via Reuters

Weapons sales approved to Taiwan

$11 billion

December 2025

US government

What the data shows, in one sentence: The tariffs achieved the narrow goal of shrinking the bilateral deficit but did not deliver the broader goals of reshoring manufacturing or changing China’s mercantilist trade posture.

Three reversals that define the 2026 policy environment

1. Nvidia H200 AI chip sales to China

What happened: Trump approved the sale in December 2025, minutes after the DOJ called the same chips a national security threat. Why it matters: It signaled that semiconductor export controls are now transactional, not categorical.

2. The one-hour Pentagon blacklist

What happened: Top Chinese tech firms were blacklisted in February 2026 and removed within an hour. Why it matters: Compliance teams cannot rely on entity lists as stable. Screening must be done at transaction time.

3. Paused export controls and port fees

What happened: Commerce rules extending controls to thousands of Chinese subsidiaries were issued in fall 2025, then paused. Planned port fees on Chinese-built vessels were also paused after Beijing’s rare earth threat. Why it matters: China’s rare earth leverage works. Any future escalation is likely to trigger similar pauses.

What exporters and importers should do

Import from China

  • Model tariff variance, not a point estimate. Build scenarios at ±25 percentage points from the current rate.
  • Verify HS classification at the 8- or 10-digit level. Governments announce tariff changes at such granular levels that two products in the same HS-4 experience very different exposure. HS Code Intelligence flags affected codes across your product catalog as tariff schedules change.
  • Watch rare earths and critical minerals. These are China’s strongest leverage and the most likely escalation trigger.

Export to China

  • Prioritize non-sensitive goods. Greer’s “managed trade” framing explicitly protects agricultural, consumer, and non-strategic categories.
  • Re-screen denied party and entity lists at transaction time — entity list changes in 2025–2026 have happened on compressed timelines, sometimes within hours.
  • Expect authorities to scrutinize AI, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing equipment most strictly — even when they approve specific transactions.

Ship via third countries

VietnamMalaysia, and Mexico have all faced transshipment-related scrutiny. Documentation of substantial transformation and rules of origin compliance is more important than it has been in a decade.

Trump tariff

What to watch at the May 2026 Trump–Xi summit

Three realistic outcomes:

  • A narrow trade deal — agricultural purchases plus selective tariff relief. Most likely.
  • A framework announcement — commitment to further talks with no substantive change.
  • A breakdown over Taiwan, semiconductors, or rare earths that resets tariffs upward.

Jonathan Czin of the Brookings Institution framed the broader situation as the US “taking pawns off the periphery rather than controlling the center of the board” — tactical wins in Panama, Taiwan arms, and Iran operations without altering the structural competition with China. The summit is likely to reflect that same pattern.

Key takeaways

  • Policy volatility is structural, not transitional. Plan around it.
  • The shift from tariff maximalism to “managed trade” favors exporters of non-sensitive goods.
  • Rare earths are China’s strongest lever and the clearest escalation indicator.
  • HS-level classification accuracy is now a direct determinant of tariff exposure.
  • The May 2026 Trump–Xi summit sets the tone for the rest of the year.

Definitions

Managed trade, where governments negotiate and adjust tariff levels, quotas, and sectoral carve-outs bilaterally rather than letting broad free-trade rules govern them. In the 2026 US–China context, it refers to USTR Greer’s stated goal of stable, balanced trade in non-sensitive goods.

Rare earth elements — A group of 17 metallic elements critical for magnets, EV motors, wind turbines, semiconductors, and defense systems. China dominates global refining and processing capacity.

Rules of origin — The criteria used to determine the national source of a product for tariff and trade-agreement purposes. Relevant for transshipment scrutiny.

Sources

  • Reuters, “Trump’s China policy appears adrift a year into second term,” Michael Martina, Trevor Hunnicutt, David Brunnstrom, April 21, 2026
  • US Census Bureau and USITC trade data, 2024–2025
  • Scott Kennedy, Center for Strategic and International Studies
  • Jonathan Czin, Brookings Institution
  • Zack Cooper, American Enterprise Institute
  • Ely Ratner, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs
  • Alex Gray, former senior US national security official
  • Wang Dong, Peking University

This article is editorial analysis for trade professionals. It is not legal, tax, or customs advice. Consult a licensed customs broker or trade attorney for transaction-specific guidance.

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